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I. INTRODUCTION
Cyberspace, heralded as the new frontier, offered the vision of a borderless
space on which no nation's Neil Armstrong would plant its flag. Although this
virtual world without boundaries offered limitless possibilities, it also posed
challenging legal problems.2 Courts around the world have grappled for years
with resulting jurisdictional questions such as when sufficient contacts within
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Cf Henry H. Perritt, Jr., 6 INTERNET NEWSLETTER, Nov. 2001, at 5 (stating, "[i]f you
balkanize the Net, you lose its global effect"); Jerry Kang, Cyber-Race, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1131,
1174 (2000) ("Balkanization should concern us in cyberspace, as in real space; on balance,
however, cyberspace does not pose any greater threat. If we want environments of cooperation
in cyberspace, then we must intentionally design and build them--as in real space. Cyberspace
does not intrinsically encourage cooperation: That would be an error of technological
determinism. However, the fact that cyberspace enables people to join together based on
common interests, experiences, and fates provides a substantial foundation upon which we can
build environments of cooperation.").
2 For an interesting discussion of issues, see LAWRENCE LESSiG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS
OFCYBERSPACE 6 (1999) (looking at the interplay between code and commerce, and commenting
"cyberspace presents something new for those who think about regulation and freedom. It
demands a new understanding of how regulation works and of what regulates life there. It
compels us to look beyond the traditional lawyer's scope--beyond laws, regulations, and
norms... The regulator is... Code... In real space we recognize how laws regulate--through
constitutions, statutes, and other legal codes. In cyberspace we must understand how code
regulates--how the software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is regulate cyberspace
as it is ... Code is law.").
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a state constitute "doing business" for purposes of jurisdiction3 and how to
take established legal principles and apply them to cyberspace. One oft quoted
court in 1997, in Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc., found it easy to
answer such questions:
[t]he likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally
exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of
commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet ....
At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant
clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters
into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve
the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the
Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper (e.g. CompuServe, Inc. v.
Patterson (citations omitted)). At the opposite end are situations
where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet
Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A
passive Web site that does little more than make information
available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the
exercise of personal jurisdiction (e.g. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v.
King (citations omitted)). The middle ground is occupied by the
interactive Web sites where the user can exchange information
with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdic-
tion is determined by examining the level of interactivity and
commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on
the Web site (e.g., Martiz, Inc. v. Cubergold, Inc. (citations
omitted)).4
However, this court's veneer of apparent simplicity merely shrouded the
argument raging among academicians and courts as well.5 Some argued that
' See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
1 STUART BIEGEL, BEYOND OUR CONTROL: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR LEGAL
SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE 17, 22-23 (2001) (discussing the conflict about the
regulation of cyberspace and likening the conflict to the one presented in the classic movie
SHANE between the ranchers who wanted fences and the cattlemen who wanted open space.
Biegel states: . . . in SHANE, fences are not necessarily a good thing. Shane himself ultimately
fights on behalf of fences, but he does so in an ambivalent and hesitant manner, and arguably for
reasons having nothing to do with his feelings regarding the true value of fenced-off land. In
[Vol. 31:225
INTERNATIONAL CYBERSPACE
cyberspace was no different than physical space and could be treated as a
physical location had historically been treated,6 while others argued that
cyberspace was unique and needed new rules to govern it.' Any hope of a
developing consensus concerning jurisdiction over cyberspace' was recently
LIBERTY VALANCE, fences are central to the development of the garden of civilization, whereas,
in CIMARRON, they represent the first step toward crass industrialization and a not entirely
positive view of progress. The answer is no simpler in cyberspace." Biegel also quotes Robert
Frost in Mending Wall). Id. at 22-23.
6 See Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CF-. L. REv. 1199, 1202 (1998)
(arguing cyberspace can be regulated by nations and that sketching "a model for grounding
cyberspace transactions in real-space law"). He concludes:
[c]yberspace transactions are no different from "real-space" transnational
transactions. They involve people in real space in one jurisdiction communi-
cating with people in real space in other jurisdictions in a way that often does
good but sometimes causes harm. There is no general normative argument
that supports the immunization of cyberspace activities from territorial
regulation. And there is every reason to believe that nations can exercise
territorial authority to achieve significant regulatory control over cyberspace
transactions. Resolution of the choice of law problems presented by
cyberspace transactions will be challenging, but no more challenging than
similar problems raised in other transnational contexts.
Id. at 1250.
' SeeDavidR. Johnson& David Post, SurveyingLaw andBorders: Law andBorders-The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1367, 1402 (1996) (arguing cyberspace is a
distinct place which requires special rules). The authors state:
[b]ut when "persons" in question are not whole people, when their "property"
is intangible and portable, and when all concerned may readily escape a
jurisdiction they do not find empowering, the relationship between the
"citizen" and the "state" changes radically. Law, defined as a thoughtful
group conversation about core values, will persist. But it will not, could not
and should not be the same law as that applicable to physically, geographi-
cally defined territories.
Id.
Compare id. (arguing cyberspace is a distinct place which requires special rules), with
Goldsmith, supra note 6, at 1202 (arguing cyberspace can be regulated based on real-space law
models), and Sanjay S. Moody, Note,National Cyberspace Regulation: Unbundling the Concept
of Jurisdiction, 37 STAN. J. INT'L L. 365 (2001).
[n]ational regulation of cyberspace is no more problematic, from ajurisdic-
tional perspective, than national regulation of real-world, land-based modes
oftransnational activity. Second, the regulation critic's failure to differentiate
between two types ofjurisdiction-jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction
to enforce--leads them to overstate the efficacy of national cyberspace
regulation. Given the territorial limits on enforcement jurisdiction and a
state's lack of obligation to enforce foreign judgments, the actual impact of
national cyberspace regulation is far less than the critics presume. Whether
2003]
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shattered by both a United States case, involving a dispute over Yahoo!'s
offering of Nazi memorabilia for sale,9 and several foreign cases dealing with
similar issues.'
In the United States case, Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme (LICRA)," the court considered the question: Can one
country or state control the flow of information into its territory via the
or not national cyberspace regulation is "legitimate" ultimately rests not on
jurisdictional factors but on a case-specific normative judgment: whether a
particular rights-based activity deserves special protection from regulation.
Thus in the cyberspace speech example, the relevant question is not whether
a state may lawfully prescribe rules governing speech, but instead whether
speech constitutes a privileged activity warranting a departure from a state-
based regulatory framework. ... [T]ransnational cyberspace commentators
must grapple with the "what" question that, until now, has mainly been the
preoccupation of domestic commentators: what substantive laws should
govern cyberspace activity. Given the greater diversity of normative
perspectives in the international (relative to the domestic) context, finding a
satisfactory answer to this question will be very difficult indeed.
Id. at 390. Other authors have struggled to make sense of cyberspace and regulation. See, e.g.,
BIEGEL, supra note 5 (chronicling the different view ofacademics on cyberspace and articulating
twenty principles for consideration in future regulation). See also LAwRENCE LESSIG, THE
FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 264 (2001) (expressing
concern about control and wanting decentralization). Lessig warns, "[w]e are a democracy
increasingly ruled byjudges.... And we are a culture that deep down believes in counterrevolu-
tion: that strangely thinks that this increase in control makes sense." Id. at 267. The Sept. 11,
2001 terrorist attack has only increased many people's willingness to allow increased control in
the interest of security. Lessig continues:
[t]he irony astounds. We win the political struggle against state control so as
to retrench control in the name of the market. We fight battles in the name of
free speech, only to have those tools turned over to the arsenal of those who
would control speech. We defend the ideal of property and then forget its
limits, and extend its reach to a space none of our founders would ever have
imagined.... Those threatened by the technology of freedom have learned
how to turn the technology off. The switch is now being thrown. We are
doing nothing about it.
Id. at 268.
' See UEJF et LICRA v. Yahoo! Inc. and Yahoo France, T.G.I. Paris, May 20, 2000,
N.00/05308 (France), at http://www.juriscom.net/txt/jurisfr/cti/yauctions20000522.htm (last
visited Mar. 24, 2003) [hereinafter LICRA v. Yahoo! France]; Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le
Racisme et L'Antisemitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
10 See generally Lisa Guernsey, Welcome to the Web. Passport, Please?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
15, 2001, at GI (discussing cases from Germany, Italy, France and Canada).
" See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
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Internet? 2 Yahoo! was seeking a declaratory judgment against the French
organization, LICRA, to clarify that this organization could not enforce a
French order in the United States. 3 Judge Fogel stated the jurisdictional
problem thus: "[w]hat is at issue here is whether it is consistent with the
Constitution and laws of the United States for another nation to regulate
speech by a United States resident within the United States on the basis that
such speech can be accessed by Internet users in that nation."' 4
This Article will explore jurisdiction in cyberspace from a number of
perspectives. First, the Article will examine recent attempts to limit the reach
of the Internet as well as concurrent efforts of some states and countries to
impose liability over Internet transmissions considered to have violated host
laws. Second, the Article will examine technological solutions, including
12 See BIEGEL, supra note 5, at 39. Biegel discusses John Perry Barlow, former writer for
The Grateful Dead and founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation. Barlow wrote the
"Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace" in 1996 on the day of the enactment of the
Communications Decency Act stating:
[c]yberspace does not lie within your borders. Do not think that you can
build it, as though it were a public construction project. You cannot ... you
do not know our culture, our ethics, or the unwritten codes that already
provide our society more order than could be obtained by any of your
impositions .... You claim there are problems among us that you need to
solve . . . . Many of these problems don't exist. Where there are real
conflicts, where there are wrongs, we will identify them and address them by
our means. We are forming our own Social Contract. This governance will
arise according to conditions of our world, not yours. Our world is different.
Cyberspace consists of transactions, relationships, and thought itself, arrayed
like a standing wave in a web of our communications.
Id. at 39 (quoting from http://www.eff.org/-Barlow/Declaration-Final.htm (last visited Aug. 28,
2000)). Biegel also notes that U.S. District Court Judge Nancy Gertner discussed the problem
of jurisdiction and the Internet in Digital Equipment Corporation v. AltaVista Technology:
[t]he change is significant. Physical boundaries typically have framed legal
boundaries, in effect creating signposts that warn that we will be required
after crossing to abide by different rules.... To impose traditional territorial
concepts on the commercial uses of the Internet has dramatic implications,
opening the Web user up to inconsistent regulations throughout the fifty
states, indeed, throughout the globe. It also raises the possibility of dramati-
cally chilling what may well be "the most participatory marketplace of mass
speech that this country-and indeed the world-has yet seen" (citation
omitted). As a result courts have been, and should be, cautious in applying
traditional concepts.
Id. at 36 (quoting 960 F. Supp. 456 (D. Mass. 1997)).
"3 See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
'4 Id. at 1186.
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geolocation software, which might permit the control desired to determine
whether this technology offers a way to circumvent the problem of expanding
jurisdiction. Third, the authors will examine existing international efforts to
address these concerns and propose several solutions.
I. CASE LAW
Societal developments, whether commercial, technological or biological,
challenge legal systems to expand to accommodate the new reality. Often-
times, it may take a number of years for one nation's law to evolve or develop.
It may take many more years for an international consensus to emerge, if such
a consensus ever does develop." A look at national developments in
cyberspace jurisdiction within several countries will identify patterns and
conflict.
A. Yahoo!: The US. and French Cases
Yahoo!'s auction site became a battleground between the French law,
which prohibits the sale or display of Nazi memorabilia, and Yahoo!, which
operates under the broad protection of the United States Constitution's First
Amendment, which has been interpreted to allow offensive speech and the
unfettered display of symbolic speech.'
On April 5, 2000, the California-headquartered Yahoo! corporation
received a "cease and desist" letter telling Yahoo! to stop offering Nazi objects
for sale within eight days. 7 In addition, La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et
L'Antisemitisme (LICRA) filed a civil complaint in France for Yahoo!'s
violation of the French criminal statute which ordered Yahoo! to:
[e]liminate French citizens' access, to any material on the
Yahoo.com auction site that offers for sale any Nazi objects,
relics, insignia, emblems, and flags;
1. Take all necessary measures to dissuade and make impossible
any access via yahoo.com to the auction service for Nazi
'5 For a review of the struggle to develop an international consensus on bribery and
corruption, see Symposium, Fighting International Corruption & Bribery in the 21st Century,
33 CORNELL INT'L L.J. No. 3 (2000).
6 See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969).
"7 Yahoo!, 169F. Supp. 2dat 1181.
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merchandise as well as to any other site or service that may be
construed as an apology for Nazism or a contest to the reality
of Nazi crimes.
2. To insure that all Internet surfers, even before they use the
link enabling them to proceed with searches on Yahoo.com,
see a warning informing them of risks involved in continuing
to view such sites.
3. Post a warning to French citizens on Yahoo.fr that any search
through Yahoo.com lead to sites containing material prohib-
ited by Section R645-1 of the French Criminal Code, and that
such viewing of the prohibited material may result in legal
action against the Internet user.'
On November 20, 2000, the French court affirmed its May 22 order and
instructed Yahoo! to "comply with the May 22 order within three (3) months
or face a penalty of 100,000 Francs (approximately U.S. $13,300) for each day
of non-compliance." 9 After deciding to try to comply with the French order
(although it steadfastly asserted its legal right to do otherwise), Yahoo! posted
a warning and amended its auction policy to prohibit "[a]ny item that
promotes, glorifies, or is directly associated with groups or individuals known
principally for hateful or violent positions or acts, such as Nazis or the Ku
Klux Klan.""0 Yahoo! claimed that these changes were not in reaction to the
French case but "grew out of its decisions to start charging auction listing fees
and not.., to be associated with businesses profiting from hate materials."'"
If this claim is true, Yahoo! made a business decision, irrespective of the
thorny legal issue of jurisdiction. In fact, Yahoo! may also have been trying
to maintain its legal position to avoid being bullied into removing other
material about which it would not be so compliant. In response to Yahoo!'s
actions, Judge Gomez, the French judge who had initially ordered Yahoo! to
remove the Nazi items, commented, "Yahoo went 10 times farther than I
asked." u
I d. at 1184.
'9 See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1185.
20 See id. at 1185.
2 See Kevin J. Delaney, Local Rules, WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2001, at R3 (discussing Judge
Jean Jacques Gomez' role in the Yahoo! case).
" See id. Judge Gomez ruled against students in 1996 that distributed copyrighted music on
the Web. He also ordered a hosting company could be ordered to shut down a Web site as an
example for posting nude pictures of someone without their permission. He believes strongly
2003]
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However, having capitulated to the ruling of Judge Gomez and seemingly
facing no further proceedings in France, Yahoo! nevertheless filed a motion for
summary judgment, seeking a declaratory judgment in United States District
Court clarifying that the First Amendment "precludes enforcement within the
U.S. of a French order intended to regulate the content of speech over the
Internet." LICRA first tried to have the case dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion and then argued that there was no real controversy because Yahoo! had
substantially complied with the court order. In reality, Yahoo! saw the threat
of future prosecution as real because it felt it could not fully comply with the
French order. The Court granted summaryjudgment for Yahoo! on November
7, 2001, noting that there was an actual controversy and a threat to Yahoo! 's
constitutional rights.
In his decision, Judge Fogel clarified what the case was NOT about:
[t]his case is not about the moral acceptability of promoting the
symbols or propaganda of Nazism. Most would agree that such
acts are profoundly offensive. By any reasonable standard of
morality, the Nazis were responsible for one of the worst displays
of inhumanity in recorded history. This Court is acutely mindful
of the emotional pain reminders of the Nazi era cause to Holo-
caust survivors and deeply respectful of the motivations of the
French republic in enacting the underlying statutes and of
defendant organizations in seeking relief under those statutes.
Vigilance is the key to preventing atrocities such as the Holo-
caust from occurring again.
Nor is this case about the right of France or any other nation
to determine its own law and social policies. A basic function of
a sovereign state is to determine by law what forms of speech and
conduct are acceptable within its borders. In this instance, as a
nation whose citizens suffered the effects of Nazism in ways that
are incomprehensible to most Americans, France clearly has the
right to enact and enforce laws such as those relied upon by the
French Court here.2'
in intellectual property rights and accountability.
' See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1193.
24 Id. at 1186.
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Then, Judge Fogel proceeded to frame the actual issue as follows:
[w]hat is at issue here is whether it is consistent with the Consti-
tution and the laws of the United States for another nation to
regulate speech by a United States resident within the United
States on the basis that such speech can be accessed by Internet
users in that nation. In a world in which ideas and information
transcend borders and the Internet in particular renders the
physical distance between speaker and audience virtually
meaningless, the implications of this question go far beyond the
facts of this case. The modem world is home to widely varied
cultures with radically divergent value systems. There is little
doubt that Internet users in the United States routinely engage in
speech that violates, for example, China's laws against religious
expression, the laws of various nations against advocacy of
gender equality or homosexuality, or even the United Kingdom's
restrictions on freedom of the press. If the government or another
party in one of these sovereign nations were to seek enforcement
of such laws against Yahoo! or another U.S.-based Internet
service provider, what principles should guide the court's
analysis? 5
Judge Fogel recognized he could sidestep the jurisdictional issue because, as
the French argued, it was no longer a "controversy," since Yahoo! was in
"substantial compliance" with the French court order and there was no
"present intention of taking legal action" against Yahoo! .26 However, Judge
Fogel noted that just because LICRA would have to institute further legal
proceedings in France to collect any fine "does not mean that Yahoo does not
face a present and ongoing threat from the existing French order."27 After all,
it is still possible to access Mein Kampf via Yahoo!.2 The Judge noted that
this U.S.-based action was not an attempt to relitigate the French action or
"disturb the French court's application of French law or its orders with respect
25 Id. at 1186.
26 Id. at 1188.
27 Id. at 1191.
28 See Search Results, http://search.yahoo.com/bin/search?p=mein+kampf (last visited Mar.
24, 2003).
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to Yahoo!'s conduct in France."29 Thus there was no need for abstention as is
the case in some forum shopping situations."
Judge Fogel also discussed the obligation and limits of comity. He noted
the precedent where "the court is not required to give effect to foreign judicial
proceedings grounded on policies which do violence to its own fundamental
interests."'" The judge noted that there were precedents for limiting comity in
this area of speech:32
[w]hat makes this case uniquely challenging is that the Internet
in effect allows one to speak in more than one place at the same
time. Although France has the sovereign right to regulate what
speech is permissible in France, this court may not enforce a
foreign order that violates the protections of the United States
Constitution by chilling protected speech that occurs simulta-
neously within our borders.33
Judge Fogel then cited the Matusevitch v. Telnikof'4 case as support.
Although not an Internet case, Matusevitch did "declin[e] to enforce British
libel judgment because British libel standards 'deprive the plaintiff of his
constitutional rights.' "" Judge Fogel found that the First Amendment
precluded enforcement of the French order within the United States,3 6 just as
the Matusevitch court had refused to enforce the British libel judgment.
Concerned with the "chill[ing] of Yahoo's First Amendment rights," Judge
Vogel found a declaratory judgment was necessary and granted a summary
judgment for plaintiff."
At the conclusion of this case, Yahoo!'s senior corporate counsel, referring
to the French court's order, commented, "who needs that hanging over your
head? To get some comfort that we would not be subject to fines, we got the
29 See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1191.
See id. at 1191 (discussing forum shopping in Supermicro Computer, Inc. v. Digitechnic,
S.A., 145 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (N.D. Cal. 2001)).
11 See id. at 1191.
32 See id. at 1192.
" See id.
4 See id.; see also Matusevitch v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1995).
11 See Yahoo!, 169 F. Supp. 2d at 1192 (quoting from Matusevich v. Telnikoff, 877 F. Supp.
1 at 41).
3 Id.
17 Id. at 1194.
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court here to rule on the matter."38 But University of Chicago Professor Jack
Goldsmith noted, "[t]he Yahoo! suit in California is unnecessary to prevent
enforcement of the judgment and was just, in my opinion, a PR ploy," because
U.S. courts would not have enforced the French order anyway.39
LICRA has appealed.' Its lawyer, Katz, argued, "There is this na've idea
that the Internet changes everything. It doesn't change everything. It doesn't
change the laws in France."' Katz added, "The real question here is, 'who
controls the Internet?' "42 Supporting this view of the Internet as having
borders, Michael A. Geist commented, "We are now seeing geographical
zoning online that mirrors geographical zoning offline. The view of the
Internet as borderless is dying very quickly."' 3 Summing up the status of the
case, Katz noted:
[r]ight now we have a situation where the French parties won in
France, and the US parties won in the US courts .... But why
should the US law win out here? No one country can rule the
Internet .... Eventually, this will have to lead to a Treaty of
some sort between countries. That's what we're hoping will be
the ultimate goal."
The Association of Deportees of Auschwitz and Upper Silesia recently sued
the former chief executive of Yahoo, Tim Koogle, in France for "justifying
war crimes and crimes against humanity."' 5 Koogle was sued for one franc.
The Court of Appeals has not ruled on LICRA's appeal to date.
" Constance Summer, Yahoo!'s Nazi Memorabilia Sales Protected in US., CORP. LEGAL
TIMEs, Feb. 2002, 58.
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 See Guernsey, supra note 10, at 1.
42 See Summer, supra note 38, at 58. Katz wants the higher court to decide that a U.S. judge
cannot have jurisdiction over his clients, in effect reopening the door to attempts to enforce the
French judgment should the need ever arise.
4 See Guernsey, supra note 10, at 1.
"See Matt Beer, Appeal Filed on Yahoo French Nazi Memorabilia Case, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Dec. 5, 2001.
45 France Claims Right to Hold Yahoo Trial, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 10, 2002, at 7.
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B. Other US. Cases: Pornography, Gambling, Hate Speech and Libel
The issue of jurisdiction over the Internet has arisen within the United
States in a number of contexts. However, the U.S. position on jurisdiction in
cyberspace is not consistent from one issue to the next. Thus, when the United
States is trying to control an activity such as gambling or the distribution of
child pornography, the approach is much different from the earlier Yahoo!
case, and the concern about stepping onjurisdictional toes seems to evaporate.
These cases, however, create precedents that may not be distinguishable in
other cases.
1. Pornography
In 1990, the Supreme Court ruled in Osborne v. Ohio" that possession of
child pornography inside the privacy of the home could still be a crime under
the law. Since the transport and importation of obscene material, including
adult pornography, is a more serious offense than simple possession,47 the
intersection of the Internet and obscenity presented the courts with new
dilemmas. The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Maxwell" addressed the
downloading of Internet pornography and the issue of jurisdiction. Mark
Maxwell, 27, from Ohio, began corresponding with a thirteen-year-old girl
over the AOL instant messenger.49 They had planned to meet and discussed
engaging in sexual acts. However, the thirteen-year-old informed police and
met Maxwell wearing a wire.'° During the meeting, Maxwell did not say
anything incriminating but was subsequently arrested.5 The police, with a
search warrant, searched his computer and car and found child pornography,
which had been downloaded via AOL 's servers in Virginia." Maxwell wastried and convicted of numerous charges, including "compelling prostitution,
-495 U.S. 103, 106-11 (1990) (holding that it is illegal to possess nude photos of minors).
Cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that Georgia's paternalistic reasoning for
law against possession of pornography was invalid).
47 See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 147 (1973) (holding that transportation of child
pornography is a crime), United States v. Twelve, 200 foot Reels, 413 U.S. 123, 130 (1973)
(holding that importation of child pornography for private use is a crime).
4 State v. Maxwell, 767N.E.2d 242 (Ohio 2002); see lmportation Found When Kiddie Porn
Images Incidentally Travel Via ISP's Virginia Servers, 7 ELEC. COM. & L. REP. 531 (2002)
(examining the decision in State v. Maxwell) [hereinafter Importation].






disseminating matter harmful to juveniles, pandering obscenity involving a
minor, and illegal use of a minor in nudity-oriented material or performance."53
The more serious charge of"pandering obscenity" criminalizes acts that "bring
or cause to be brought into this state any obscene material that has a minor as
one of its participants or portrayed observers."'
The Ohio Court of Appeals found for Maxwell because the defendant might
not have known he was importing the child pornography."5 In turn, the Ohio
Supreme Court reversed the Appeals court, finding that the statute "demon-
strates the clear intent of the General Assembly to impose strict liability on the
act of bringing child pornography into the state.""' The court found that the
fact that the statute was enacted before the advent of the Internet was not a
reason to refrain from applying the statute. The dissent in the case argued that
importing child pornography carries a harsher penalty than simple possession
and, in this case, the defendant had no knowledge he was importing. Justice
Evelyn Lundberg Stratton also noted that "as frightening as it is, innocent users
can possess pornography of any type, child pornography or other, with no
intention of doing so by receiving email attachments or through a mistaken
search on the Web."" However, the defendant in this case was not the
innocent recipient of an email attachment or a mistaken Web search caused by
a mistyped name. Thus, the majority of the Court agreed that this was
importation in violation of the statute. 8
In another Internet pornography case, Ashcroft v. ACLU," the Supreme
Court, in 2002, blocked enforcement of the Child Online Protection Act
(COPA) pending further review at the lower court. COPA criminalizes placing
on the Internet material of a sexual nature that "is harmful to minors," and
places civil penalties on violators. The statutory standard "applies contempo-
rary community standards" and is triggered if violators intend to profit from
the activity. Justices Breyer and O'Connor advocated for a "national
standard" whereas Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg and Souter expressed concern
that the statutory test "subjects every Internet speaker to the standards of the
" Id. at 245.
54Id.




59 535 U.S. 564 (2002); see also Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 (2002)
(finding law that bans animated child pornography unconstitutional).
'o Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. at 586-87.
2003]
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
most puritanical community in the United States."6' It will be several years
before the Supreme Court decides with finality whether to apply a national
standard for deciding obscenity. A national standard raises a difficult issue for
small towns that do not want to be governed by a New York or Los Angeles
standard. This question may be asked at an international level as well. Given
the structure of the Internet, an international standard for obscenity may make
the most sense, but for the reasons stated above is extremely unlikely.62
2. Gambling
The courts have also addressed Internet gambling. While Nevada allows
land-based gambling, New York does not. The Attorney General of New York
became aware of Internet gambling operating in Antigua and initiated the case,
People ex rel. Vacco v. World Interactive Gaming Corp.63 World Interactive
Gambling Corporation (WIGC) is a Delaware corporation which is headquar-
tered in New York. WIGC has a subsidiary corporation, Golden Chips Casino,
Inc. (GCC), in Antigua. GCC has servers in Antigua and a Web site that
allows people to log on, download interactive software, and gamble from
home." WIGC was also engaged in improper solicitation of securities
offerings. WIGC sold $1,843,665 worth of investments to 114 investors,
including $125,000 to New York residents.65 If someone from New York
logged on, he would be denied gambling permission, but, if he changed his
address to Nevada, access would be granted.66 WIGC argued that "the
transactions occurred offshore and that no state or federal law regulates
Internet gambling." '7 WIGC asserted that cyberspace gamblers were actually
visiting Antigua where gambling is legal. The court looked at the standard
articulated in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, defined as "purposefully
engaged in significant activities such that he has 'availed himself of the
privilege of conducting business [in the forum state].' "" The court dismissed
WIGC's argument, stating in part:
61 Lyle Denniston, Court Puts 2d Pornography Law on Hold, BOSTON GLOBE, May 14,
2002, at A2.
62 See id.




61 See id. at 848.
6 Id. at 849 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,276 (1985)).
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[g]ambling conducted via the Internet from New York to Antigua
is indistinguishable from any other form of gambling since both
the [Federal] Wire Act and Travel Act apply to the transmission
of information into a foreign country.69
The court issued an injunction and noted that restitution payments, as well
as penalties and costs, were warranted.7" The court also noted that each
individual defendant was liable because the court pierced the corporate veil."
The court did not seem troubled about blocking New York residents' access
to what the state officials deemed illegal activities. Yet, there was no attempt
to go after the Antiguan entity and shut down their online gambling operation.
In fact, technology offers another way to block residents' forays into activities
deemed illegal by the state. One San Diego company, Virtgame.com, found
a way to block United States-based people from gambling on an offshore Web
site.72 The company's founder, Bruce Merati, noted, "[t]he Internet is
worldwide with no boundaries, no ownership and no legal jurisdiction. Our
technology establishes boundaries on the Internet."73 The prospect of
technological solutions mooting the jurisdictional questions will be discussed
in Part Ell of this Article.
3. Hate Speech
The Yahoo!74 case addressed France's problem with Yahoo!'s auction site
offering Nazi memorabilia for sale in violation of French law. Yahoo!
capitulated in France and essentially complied with the French court's order."
Had Yahoo! not done so, the French court would have had no difficulty
imposing a daily fine until the company complied. The law in France, as in
many other European countries, is clear with regard to hate literature.76 The
6 Vacco, 714 N.Y.S.2d at 852.
70 See id.
71 See id. at 854.
7 See Kathryn Balint, Cyber-Law's Growing Pains, SAN DIEGO UNIONTRIB., Jan. 27,2001,
at Al.
73 See id.
'4 See Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme et L'Antisernitisme, 169 F. Supp. 2d 1181
(N.D. Cal. 2001).
75 See id.
76 See, e.g., Alexander Tsesis, Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the Internet,
38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 817, 853 (2001).
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United States, in contrast, has espoused a different set of values that places
freedom of speech as the ultimate value, the "first" of many."
However, the United States Supreme Court may soon have a chance to
revisit the issue of balancing one speaker's First Amendment rights, particu-
larly in an Internet forum, against another's right to be free from intimidation
and threats. Two recent cases may reshape the legal standards in the United
States on this issue:78 Planned Parenthood of Columbia v. American Coalition
of Life Activities 9 and Black v. Commonwealth."°
In the first case, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals overturned their previous
ruling by a 6-5 vote in American Coalition Life Activists v. Planned Parent-
hood." The court found that Web sites which "greyed-out" abortion doctors
who had been injured by an anti-abortion activist and "blacked-out" those who
had been killed were "true threats" and thus not protected by the First
Amendment. 2 The Court noted that, "[v]iolence is not a protected value nor
is a true threat of violence with intent to intimidate."8'3 The District Court
initially awarded $109 million in damages to the plaintiffs but the Court of
Appeals overturned the Award of Damage and ordered reconsideration of the
award and a review of whether the award is excessive. This case likely will
be appealed to the Supreme Court and will present the Court with an
" See, e.g., id. at 838-49.
78 See id. Tsesis argues for a criminal law, albeit imperfect, to address hate speech. He
comments on private efforts through PICS, or Platforms for Internet Content Selection, systems
and notes that China blocks access to U.S. government sites. Id. at 867. He distinguishes free
speech thus:
[c]riminal penalties should be imposed on persons who intend harm and
violence against identifiable groups.... Tolerance and egalitarianism should
not be sacrificed at the altar of an absolutist free speech doctrine. It is in the
public interest to manifest disapprobation for hate speech and to distinguish
it from legitimate forms of political dialogue. False statements about
identifiable groups do nothing to further mutual respect for inalienable rights.
Government should not allow Internet users to foment worldwide intolerance
and inequality. Instead, it should realize the potential global threats posed by
hate speech on the Internet, the very purpose of which is to destroy democ-
racy. ....
Id. at 873-74.
" Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activist, 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.
2002).
s Black v. Commonwealth, 553 S.E.2d 738 (Va. 2001).
sI Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (D. Or.






opportunity to consider how to evaluate Internet threats. Although in the past,
courts have given wide berth to this type of speech,84 in the aftermath of
Columbine and the September 11 terrorist attacks, there may be heightened
sensitivity to the reality of threats and the deleterious impact that they have in
chilling the freedoms of targeted individuals. In this context, the United States
may be more willing to join with the international consensus that hate speech
is the new obscenity which nations can live without.
In the second case, Black v. Commonwealth, the United States Supreme
Court agreed to review Virginia's Supreme Court decision to strike down a
state law that forbids cross burning. The court noted:
[t]he General Assembly (in 1952) acted to combat a particular
form of intimidating symbolic speech- the burning of a cross. It
did not proscribe the burning of a circle or a square, because no
animating message is contained in such an act... Government
may not regulate speech based on hostility-or
favoritism--towards the underlying message expressed.85
In contrast, Virginia officials argued that:
[t]he Virginia statute does not ban cross burning only in situa-
tions when it targets minorities. The law is broader,
criminalizing cross burning any time it is done to intimidate
anyone. Today a burning cross-standing alone and without
explanation-is typically understood in our society as a message
of intimidation. This is so regardless of the race, religion, or
other characteristics of the individual targeted. 6
Reviewing this case will allow the Supreme Court to revisit the issue from
its 1992 case, R.A. V. v. St. Paul,87 and perhaps bring the U.S. position on hate
speech into closer alignment with other countries which often have a different
approach to this issue.
" See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982) ("If we catch any of
you going in any of them racist stores, we're gonna to break your damn neck.").
's Black, 553 S.E.2d at 776, 779.
Lyle Denniston, Court to Rule on Legality of State Cross-Burning Bans, BOSTON GLOBE,
May 29, 2002, at A3.
8" See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (limiting regulation of free speech to
"fighting words").
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Many other Western countries view hate speech as pernicious and
deleterious to the population. Of course, these countries watched as Nazism
came to power virtually unchecked in some places, and they want to correct
what they perceive as their mistake in allowing this to happen."8 The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, 9 signed by the United States in 1966, requires signatories to
criminalize "all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority and hatred
and incitement to racial discrimination." To date, it does not seem that the
United States has taken this commitment seriously. However, the ease with
which hate speech can cross national boundaries via the Internet means that the
U.S. may now feel increasing pressure to take a more aggressive stance against
hate speech.
4. Libel
The Internet did not create the issue of enforcement of foreign judgments
in the United States. In fact, what is considered libelous in one country may
be protected speech in the United States. The classic case is the frequently
cited Matusevitch v. Telnikov,9" where a United States court refused to enforce
a British libel judgment against one man who accused another of making an
anti-Semitic comment. In Matusevitch, the Court noted that such an enforce-
ment action is not required by comity and would conflict with United States
constitutional guarantees. However, the Internet surely poses some new
challenges in the libel arena.
In June of 2002, the Virginia case Stanley Young v. New Haven Advocate
was argued before the United States Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit.92 In
1999, Connecticut prisons began sending inmates to prisons in Virginia. Two
reporters for the papers each wrote articles about Wallens Ridge prison, noting
the "harsh conditions" and "mistreatment" by prison guards.93 The articles
appeared on two Web sites as well. Stanley Young, the warden at Wallens
ss See Tsesis, supra note 76, at 858.
89 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Mar.
7, 1966, 17 U.S.T. 239, 60 U.N.T.S. 195.
I0 d.
9' See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1995).
See 184 F. Supp. 2d 498 (W.D. Vir. 2001), rev 'd, Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315
F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002). Cf Carl S. Kaplan, Stanley Young Prison Warden Suing Tribune Co.
Which Publishes Hartford Courant and New Haven Advocate, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 2002, at CI
(discussing U.S. Ct. of Appeals 4th Circuit arguments in the case).
" See Kaplan, supra note 92.
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Ridge, alleged defamation. The district court found there was jurisdiction.
The question for the court was whether the alleged defamation occurred in
Connecticut where the material was published and placed on the Web site, or
in Virginia, where it was downloaded by Young and others.
In Calder v. Jones,9 the United States Supreme Court addressed jurisdic-
tion over a Florida-based publisher that sent over 100,000 copies of a magazine
into California. The Court stated that:
[t]he allegedly libelous story concerned the California activities
of a California resident. It impugned the professionalism of an
entertainer whose television career was centered in California.
The article was drawn from California sources, and the brunt of
the harm, in terms both of respondent's emotional distress and
the injury to her professional reputation was suffered in Califor-
nia. In sum, California is the focal point both of the story and the
harm suffered. Jurisdiction over petitioner is therefore proper in
California based on the "effects" of their Florida conduct in
California.95
Although this was not an Internet case, the principles are still relevant and
applicable.
Daniel Burk of the University of Minnesota commented:
the law views a publisher as intentionally directing harm to the
place where the libel victim's reputation matters--where he or
she lives, and where his or her friends read the articles. The mere
posting of a possibly libelous article is enough to merit jurisdic-
tion in the state where the plaintiff resides. I'd love the Supreme
Court to revisit that but as the law stands now that is what it
says.'
In the Young case, Young claimed that the articles "conveyed to the commu-
nity at large that Young was a racist who advocates and tolerates racism and
abuse of inmates by the correctional officers under his control."97 The case
94 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
'5 Id. at 788.
"Kaplan, supra note 92, at C6.
"See Young, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 503.
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case turned on the interpretation of the Virginia Long Arm Statute, which
states in part that personal jurisdiction is appropriate if that person is:
(3) Causing a tortious injury by act or omission in this
Commonwealth; or (4) causing tortious injury in this
Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this
Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or
engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives
substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services
rendered in this Commonwealth. 8
Secondly, the jurisdiction must not offend the notion of due process. The
court noted that "[t]o meet the minimum contacts requirement, the out-of-state
individual must have purposefully directed his or her activity toward the forum
state. '' 9
Judge Williams began the analysis by framing the question as follows:
[u]ltimately, this case revolves around the interesting question of
where acts or omissions conducted in cyberspace actually occur.
Therefore, this court must first determine whether the defendants,
either acting directly or through an agent, caused an injury from
an act or omission within Virginia or outside of Virginia (citation
omitted). If the court finds that the acts or omissions which are
alleged to have caused injury occurred in Virginia, the court may
exercise jurisdiction over these defendants .... If the court finds
that these acts or omissions occurred outside of Virginia, the
court must then determine if the defendants regularly did or
solicited business or engaged in any other persistent course of
conduct, or derived substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed or services rendered in Virginia (citation omitted).
Next, the court must determine if the exercise of personal
jurisdiction in this case would exceed the limits of due process"°
(citation omitted).
" Id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A)(3), (4) (Michie 2000)).
Id. (citing Lesnick v. Hollingsworth & Vose Co., 35 F.3d 939, 945 (4th Cir. 1994)).
'00 Id. at 503-04.
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offending material is circulated."' 2 Ten to fifteen thousand copies of Hustler
were circulated in New Hampshire each month. 3 The plaintiff also cited
Calder v. Jones'" which focused on the "intentional actions of the writers." 105
The Calder court noted that the defendants in that case "aimed their activities
at California as the defendants knew their article would cause substantial harm
or injury to the plaintiff in California.""
The defendant in Young tried to distinguish these cases by noting that they
did not involve the Internet. The defendant had cited two Internet cases from
otherjurisdictions where the courts found insufficient contacts"' or, borrowing
from Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Corn, Inc.,0 8 found a passive Web site
without sufficient contacts to trigger jurisdiction.9
Judge Williams did not accept the New Haven Advocate's argument and
approvingly cited the TELCO Communications v. An Apple A Day case, noting
"[t]he TELCO court refused to distinguish between mailing paper letters and
the use of a computer with access to the Internet to read information."' " Judge
Williams then joined this line of cases and concluded, "this court agrees with
TELCO in that information placed on the Internet Web site should be subjected
to multistage jurisdiction."'..
Judge Williams then examined the ruling in Christian Science Board of
Directors ofthe First Church of Christ v. Nolan"2 where the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit upheld the ruling of a North Carolina court which found
jurisdiction over two men, one from North Carolina and the other from
Arizona, who maintained a Web site critical of the Christian Science church." 3
The judge concluded that in this case there was "purposeful availment," and
that the "acts were neither fortuitous nor unintentional.""..4 Judge Williams,
'02 Id. at 777 (citing Restatement (Second)'of Torts § 577A cmt. a (1977)).
'03 Id. at 772.
'o 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
'o See Stanley Young v. New Haven Advocate, 184 F. Supp. 2d 498, 506 (W.D. Vir. 2001),
rev'd, Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir. 2002) (discussing Calder v. Jones
at 788-90).
106 Id.
:07 See id. at 506-07 (discussing Schapp v. McBride, 64 F. Supp. 2d 608 (E.D. La. 1998)).
'o 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
109 See Young, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 507 (discussing Roche v. Worldwide Media, Inc., 90 F.
Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Va. 2000)).
'10 Id. at 508.
"I Id.
112 259 F.3d 209 (4th Cir. 2001).
'" See Young, 184 F. Supp. 2d at 509 (discussing Nolan).
114 Id. at 510.
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The judge concluded that in this case there was "purposeful availment," and
that the "acts were neither fortuitous nor unintentional."" 4 Judge Williams,
finding that there was "purposeful availment 'and that the acts of the
defendants were not fortuitous or unintentional, concluded that jurisdiction
was consistent with due process in the Young case and denied the motion to
dismiss."' The Young case was argued on appeal before the Fourth Circuit in
June 2002, and was reversed.
Judge Michael found that the court "cannot constitutionally exercise
jurisdiction over the Connecticut-based newspaper defendants because they did
not manifest an intent to aim their Web sites or their posted articles at a
Virginia audience."" 6
Looking at the record, Judge Michael concluded that "the overall content
of both Web sites is directly local.." The main point of the articles
encompassed the Connecticut prison transfer policy and "encouraged a public
debate in Connecticut.""... The judge concluded that the "newspapers do not
have sufficient Internet contacts with Virginia to permit the district court to
exercise specific jurisdiction over them.""' 9 The court expressed concern that
an opposite ruling would leave anyone posting material on the Internet "subject
to personal jurisdiction in every state"'20 thus subverting traditional due
process guarantees.
In an earlier case, ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc.,'21 the
same Fourth Circuit denied jurisdiction in Maryland over an Internet service
provider from Georgia. The ISP, Digital, allowed its customer, Alternative
Products, Inc. to place photos that were apparently taken from ALS Scan, Inc.
on the Internet and thus derive revenue form this action. Digital maintained
that it played no role in the copyright infringement scheme, it simply provided
bandwidth. It also asserted that it had no contacts with Maryland. The court
noted:
[w]e are not prepared at this time to recognize that a state may
obtain general jurisdiction over out-of-state persons who
.4 Id. at 510.
115 See id.
116 315 F.3d 256,258-59 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing ALS Scan, Inc., Digital Service Consultants,
Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002)).
"7 Id. at 263.
... Id. at 264.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 263 (quoting from ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Service Consultants, Inc.).
121 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 868, 2003 U.S. LEXIS 596 (2003).
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decide today what that "something more" is because ALS Scan
has shown no more.' 22
This case is the proverbial easy case because the ISP had no connection to the
enterprise of Alternative Products. The more difficult case would be if Digital
was both a publisher and an ISP.
In a California Appeals Court case, Pavlovich v. Santa Clara Superior
Court,23 a student at Purdue University posted on a Web site codes that could
be used to break DVD encryption of movies so they could be copied. " DVD
Copy Control Association sued defendants in Santa Clara Superior Court.
Pavlovich asserted that California did not have jurisdiction over him because
he had no contacts with the state. ,25 The Appeals Court reasoned that, because
Pavlovich knew of the dominant presence of the movie and technology
industries in California, he knew or should have known that his actions would
affect those California industries. 126  Robert Sugarman, Attorney for the
Petitioners, dismissed "doomsday rhetoric" concerns about the dangers of
"extend[ing] California law to any place with an Internet connection."'' 27
Sugerman also stated, "[t]he lower courts merely upheld established legal
principles that allow states to protect their citizens from illegal acts aimed at
them from beyond their borders."'"
On November 25, 2002 the sharply divided Supreme Court of California
reversed and remanded the case. '9 Justice Brown noted that Pavlovich had no
contracts with California. The court applied an "effects test."''3 The only
contact was the posting of source code on the Web site that could be accessed
by someone from California. The court had to confront whether this was
sufficient to meet the requirement of "purposeful availment."'' The court
acknowledged that the "question is close,"'32 but found that it was not
sufficient to conferjurisdiction. The court noted then the remaining question:
122 293 F.3d at 715 (emphasis added).
'3 See 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (2001), rev'd by Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr.
2d 329 (Cal. 2002); see also Rob Gavin, Who Sets the Rules?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2002, at
R13 (discussing the Pavlovich case).
124 See Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 909.
'25 See id. at 911.
,26 See id. at 916.
"1 See Gavin, supra note 123.
128 Id.
29 Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329.
130 Id. at 338.
,3, Id. at 340.
132 Id.
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"[t]hus, the only question in this case is whether Pavlovich's knowledge that
his tortious conduct may harm certain industries centered in California-i.e.
the motion picture, computer and consumer electronics industries-is
sufficient to establish express aiming at California."
The court concluded "this knowledge by itself cannot establish purposeful
availment under the effects test."'' 3  The court clarified that this was a very
narrow decision. 34 The court stated:
[w]e merely hold that this knowledge alone is insufficient to
establish express aiming at the forum state as required by the
effects test. Because the only evidence in the record even
suggesting express aiming is Pavlovich's knowledge that his
conduct may harm industries centered in California, due process
requires us to decline jurisdiction over his person.'35
The court noted that the plaintiff had the resources to sue Pavlovich in
Indiana or Texas and thus this ruling did not preclude his "fac[ing] the
music. '
The dissent argued that the defendant should not be able to "shield
themselves from suit simply by using the Internet... as a means of inflicting
the harm." '13 7 Judge Baxter noted that a ruling affirming jurisdiction would not
expose the defendant to "universal and unpredictable jurisdiction. He faces
suit only in a particular forum where he directed his injurious conduct, and
where he must reasonably anticipate being called to account."''3 Judge Baxter
disputed that this was akin to a passive Web site.
In another Internet case, Nam Tai Electronics v. Titzer,'3 9 the California
courts acted once again. Nam Tai, a British Virgin Islands company doing
business in Hong Kong, filed suit against Colorado resident Joe Titzer, who
allegedly posted defamatory messages about Nam Tai on a Yahoo! message
board. The trial court found no jurisdiction. 4" The California Appeals Court
agreed.'" Titzer used "seven aliases [and] posted 246 messages on Yahoo!
133 Id.
134 Id. at 343.
13' Pavlovich v. Superior Court, 127 Cal. Rptr. 2d 329.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 351.
133 Id. at 352.
139 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769 (2001).




Internet message boards about Nam Tai's stock."'42 Titzer had agreed to
Yahoo!'s terms of service which included a provision that the laws of
California should govern the relationship between Yahoo! and the individual
user and that the subscriber agreed to submit to California jurisdiction. 43 The
Court noted that Nam Tai had no particular connection to California and
analogized the Nam Tai case to another California case, Jewish Defense
Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court.'" The Court in Jewish Defense
Organization held that:
[plaintiff] failed to establish he had any clients in California, or
that the alleged defamatory statements herein would impact a
business interest or reputation in California .... There is an
insufficient basis in this record to conclude that California is
[plaintiff's] principal place of business, or that the alleged
defamation was targeted at California or would cause the brunt
of the harm in California. Accordingly, there is not sufficient
evidence showing defendants' minimum contacts with California
under the analysis set out in cases dealing with defamation by
nonresidents. 14
The Nam Tai court found that the defendants' comments posted on Yahoo!
were not directed at Californians.'" The court distinguished the Pavlovich
case where the out of state student targeted the California motion picture
industry. 4 " The only connection Nam Tai could argue existed between the
company, California, and Titzer, was that because Nam Tai stock trades on
NASDAQ and California is a populous state, investors might be hurt.4 The
court noted:
[t]he issue is not whether the company that makes the Web sites
available is incorporated or based in California .... The determi-
native question is whether the Web sites themselves are of
particular significance to California or Californians such that the
142 Id.
141 See id. at 1305.
'- 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611 (Cal Ct. App. 1999).
145 113 Ca. Rptr. 2d at 775 (quoting court in Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior
Court, 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 611, 620 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1999)).
'46 See id. at 776.
147 See id. at 778 (discussing Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909 (Cal. App. 2001)).
14B See id. at 778 (discussing Pavlovich, 109 Cal. Rptr. 2d 909).
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[t]he issue is not whether the company that makes the Web sites
available is incorporated or based in California. . . The
determinative question is whether the Web sites themselves are
of particular significance to California or Californians such that
the user has reason to know the posting of a message will have
significant impact in this state. 49
Titzer did sign an agreement when he registered with Yahoo! that all
disputes would be heard in California, but this agreement did not
unambiguously apply to third parties. 5 ' Further, the appellant failed to prove
the existence of a relationship between the state and the injury, thus the court
declined jurisdiction.'' This outcome is analogous to a non-Internet case,
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California,"2 where the court
ruled that there would be no jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant for
simply putting an item (a tire valve) into the stream of commerce." 3 It is
interesting to note in that case that the California resident had already settled
his claim and so California's interest between Japanese and Taiwanese
manufacturers was slight." The Supreme Court has not definitively answered
the question of when Internet contacts rise to the level of "sufficient minimum
contacts" for purposes of jurisdiction. s
C. Germany
There has been legal fallout from the Yahoo! cases in other countries.'56
The German railways pressured Yahoo!, AltaVista and Google to remove a site
that detailed how to sabotage trains, although this information had been
available for five years.'5" A Dutch judge ruled the Web site, "Little Guide to
'49 Id. at 776.
ISO Id. at 777.
"Is Nam Tai, 113 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 778.
152 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
153 See id.
t54 Id.
"I See DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Pavlovich, 2003 WL 46660 (2003) (upholding Cal.
Sup. Ct. and overruling Cal. App. in Pavlovich).
u Cf. Delaney, supra note 21 (noting a German court convicted the head of CompuServe of
distributing child porn in 1998 because the company did not block illegal postings. A higher
German court later overturned that decision. This poses dramatic business implications for a
company. PSINet, Inc. shut down its business in Germany because of fear of what happened to
CompuServe).
'7 See Martin Bensk, German Rail Chiefs Foil the Internet Saboteurs, DEuTsciHE PRESSE-
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transshipments of radioactive waste and are willing to do anything to stop
these shipments, including serious tampering with rail lines.'59 The problem
is that one can still buy books detailing sabotage strategies. Deutsche Bahn
lawyer Christian Schreyer stated, "[w]e're talking here about a [web] site
which incites people to sabotage the railways. This [sic] has nothing to do
with stopping free speech."'"
In another German case, a Mannheim district court found that German law
does not have jurisdiction over online publications. 6' This case involved hate
speech posted on an Australian Web site. Specifically, this Web site contained
material denying that the Nazi Holocaust was a systematic attempt by the
German government to exterminate Jews. 6 This revisionist historical material
contained inferences which could clearly be construed as anti-Semitic and
which would likely cause distress to Jewish people and others who accessed
the site. In Australia, Dr. Fredrick Toben, the founder of the site, was found
to have violated a local anti-discrimination statute, but in Germany, the
problem was more complex and raised ajurisdictional issue.'63 Because of the
role of Germany in the Holocaust, the German government is hyper-vigilant
about any signs of Neo-Nazism. This vigilance has resulted in a law which
makes "denying the Holocaust" illegal in Germany.'" Thus, Germany claimed
that, even though the objectionable material was originally posted in Australia,
Dr. Toben's Web site violated German law. 6"
In denying jurisdiction, the Mannhein court relied on the premise that the
place of publication determined jurisdiction.'" Thus, since the material
originated in Australia, Germany had no jurisdiction in this case. The court
also supported its decision by emphasizing that to access this material, a
German citizen would have to actively decide to enter this site and download
the objectionable material. 67 Here, the German court seems to stress, as did
the U.S. court in Yahoo!, that, if tolerance for abusive free speech is different
159 Id.
160 Id.
161 See German Court Sentences Australian Holocaust Skeptic (Fredrick Toben), 18 J. HIST.
REV. 2 (1999), available at http://www.ihr.org/jhr/vl8/v 8n4p-2-Toben.html (visited January
21, 2003) [hereinafter German Court].
162 See id.
163 See id.
'" See generally Klaus Ganther, The Denial of the Holocaust: Employing Criminal Law to
Combat Anti-Semitism in Germany, 15 TEL Aviv U. STUD. L. 51 (2000).
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where the material is published from where it is received, jurisdiction is tied
to where the Internet material is published.
D. Italy
A recent Italian case 68 also considered whether place of publication of
objectionable Internet material determines where jurisdiction resides.
However, this case concerned a libel suit resulting from Internet postings. In
this case, the Italian court found that Italy had jurisdiction over a Web site in
Israel which posted "extremely negative defamatory opinions" on the character
of the plaintiff, who resided in Italy, and on the conduct of Italian judicial
authorities. 69 The Italian court found that if the libelous material can be
accessed where the defamed party resides, that court has jurisdiction. 7'
Unlike the German court in the Toben case,' the Italian court did not find the
place where the Internet material was published to determine jurisdiction.'72
The Italian case resulted from a custody dispute over two minor children. '73
When the mother of these children came to fear that the Italian courts would
remove the children from her custody due to the father's complaints about their
Orthodox Jewish upbringing, she left Italy and took the children to Israel to
live. 74 There she continued to bring her daughters up as Orthodox Jews.'
When the father located his children in Israel, the Israeli court relinquished the
children to his custody, acknowledging that the custody dispute had to be
decided where it had originated, in the Italian court. 76 Once the children were
removed from Israel, several Web sites in Israel began posting what the father
saw as libelous material, including suggestions that Jews should "free" the
girls from captivity by their father.'"
In asserting jurisdiction in this case, the Italian court cited the "theory of
ubiquity," which allows them to deal with a crime which was initiated
16 No National Boundaries for Libel on the Internet, Court of Cassation, Judgment No. 4741
(Dec. 27, 2000), at http://www.cdt.org/speech/international/00 I 227italiandecision.pdf.
169 Id.
170 Id.
1 See German Court, supra note 161.




76 See The Dulberg Case Information Center, The Case in Brief, available at http://www.ou.
org/public/statements/1999/dulbergcaseinbrief.htm (last visited Apr. 1, 2003).
'77 See No National Boundaries for Libel on the Internet, supra note 168.
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elsewhere but whose effects are felt in Italy.'78 Here, the court applied Italy's
libel law to the unique environment of the Internet. In this high tech
environment, the court reasoned, the actual crime of libel does not occur when
the defamatory material is posted on the Internet.'79 Rather, the offense occurs
when this material is viewed by "third parties," since the posting itself does not
defame the individual.'° In other words, viewing the material and assimilating
its meaning causes the defamation. Hence, although the libelous material in
this case was posted in Israel, the actual libel occurred in Italy (as well as in
other countries around the globe) and so the Italian courts had jurisdiction.
The court found that the same libel laws which apply to other media, such
as print and media broadcasts, could be applied logically to libel which takes
place via the Internet.' If anything, this court felt that libeling someone via
the Internet was more pernicious than libeling someone via other forms of
media since the Internet can disseminate material much more widely and much
more quickly. In this context, then, the Italian court felt that claiming
jurisdiction provides an important protection for its citizens.
E. Canada
A Canadian Human Rights Tribunal recently acted upon a complaint from
Sabina Citron, the founder of the Canadian Holocaust Remembrance
Association, about Ernst Zundel's Web site which denied the holocaust."8 2
The Commission found a violation:
[b]ased upon our view that the Zundel site materials characterize
Jews as liars, cheats, criminals and thugs who have deliberately
engaged in a monumental fraud designed to extort funds, we
regard it as highly likely that readers of these materials will, at a
minimum, hold Jews in very low regard, viewing them either






282 Paul Lungen, Citron Gratified at Tribunal's Zundel Website Decision, 32 CAN. JEWISH
NEWS, Feb. 14 (2002), at 26.
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The Commission ordered Zundel to cease and desist. '" Unfortunately, Zundel
then moved to Tennessee."8 5
In another incident, ICrave, a Canadian company, created the concept of
"TV on the Internet."'" 6 The concept was to let people in their office watch
TV. The company started in November 1999 and had 800,000 hits in the first
month. The Motion Picture Association, NFL and NBA sued ICrave in
Pittsburgh, which was where ICrave had registered its domain name. On
February 8, 2000, the United States District Court issued a preliminary
injunction preventing ICrave from broadcasting in the U.S. Since there was
no technology to stop the signal leaking, the company was compelled to shut
off broadcasting. The involved parties reached a settlement on February 29,
2000. " ' ICrave believed rebroadcast was legal in Canada but settled issues.
They have a new technology called "iWall" which supposedly prevents
"leaking" into the United States.
8
F. Australia
Australia has had to deal with the issue of jurisdiction over the Internet in
several high profile cases. Like France, it does not have a problem limiting
access to some material or penalizing those who post material deemed in
violation of law. In May of 2002, a high profile case, Dow Jones & Co. v.
Gutnick, was argued before the High Court."8 9 Joseph Gutnick sued Dow
Jones for defamation. The article had "implied that he (Gutnick) had
laundered money through jailed Victorian money launderer Nachum
Goldberg."' The lower court said the matter should be heard in Victoria,
Australia, because Gutnick downloaded the article there from a subscriber-only
1u Id.
IS Id. See also Regina v. Keegstra, [1994] 23 Alta. L.R.3d 4 92 C.C.C.3d 505 (1994)
(describing the development of Canada's hate propaganda laws), rev'd by Regina v. Keegstra,
[1996] 39 Alta. L.R.3d 305.
86 See Greg Grazin, Breaking Into the Big Internet Bucks, EDMONTON SUN, June 28, 2000,
at 53.
" See Press Release, Motion Picture Association of America, i Crave Signs Settlement
Agreement That Shuts Down Web Site (Feb. 28, 2000), available at http://www.mpaa.org/
PRess/CraveSettlement.htm.
"s For critical discussion see Ashley A. Johnson, HackingDigital Video Recorders: Potential
Copyright Liability for D VR Hackers and Service Providers, 2001 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 29,
42(2001).
89 See [2001] V.S. Ct. 305; see also Katherine Towers, Media's Big Guns Try to Intervene
in Gutnick Case, AUSTL FIN. REV., May 15, 2002, at 3.
'"~ Towers, supra note 189, at 3.
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Web site.' 9' Dow Jones wanted the case heard in New York or New Jersey
because that is where the material was put on the server.1
92
The Web site had 550,000 subscribers with 1700 people, several hundred
in the Victoria area, paying by credit card from Australia. The plaintiff also
had affidavits from people who downloaded the article. Judge Hedigan found
that publication occurred where it was downloaded.' 93 The judge noted that
many of the arguments on the other side are "policy driven," "perhaps by a
belief in the superiority of the United States' concept of freedom of speech
over the management of freedom of speech in other places and lands."'94
The court then turned to the forum non-conveniens issue. The defendant
claimed that the location of the servers in New Jersey was the appropriate
forum and warned that the danger of libel actions might lead businesses to
ignore Australia for fear of expensive litigation. The court did an extensive
review of case law and concluded:
[w]eighing up and balancing all of these factors, I reach a clear
conclusion that the State of Victoria is both the appropriate
forum and convenient forum for the deposition of the litigation
commenced by the plaintiff. Many of the defendant's claimed
difficulties are more imagined than real, but, at the end of the
day, the most significant of the features favouring a Victorian
jurisdiction is that the proceeding has been commenced by a
Victorian resident conducting his business and social affairs in
this State, in respect of a defamatory publication published in this
State, suing only upon publication in this state and disclaiming
any form of damages in any other place.' 95
This case was argued before the High Court and a decision issued December
10, 2002 affirming the lower court and dismissing the appeal."9 The High
Court of Australia noted, "Mr. Gutnick's claim was thereafter a claim for
191 See id.; see also David Wotherspoon, Dow Jones & Company v. Gutnick: Jurisdiction in
Internet Defamation, The Continuing Legal Society of British Columbia, at http://www.cle.bc.
ca/CLE/Stay+Current/Collection/2002/12/02-hca-dowjones (Dec. 19. 2002).
" See Maria Moscaritola, Internet Test Case, ADELAIDE ADVERTISER, May 29,2002, at 28.
113 Dow Jones & Co., [2001] V.S. Ct. at 22.
194 Id.
'9 Id. at 74.
'g' Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56 (2002) 1994 A.L.R. 433.
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damages for a tort committed in Victoria, not a claim for a tort committed
outside the jurisdiction."'97
The question is: where has publication occurred? Certainly France and
Germany had no difficulty finding the action occurred when the material was
downloaded in Australia. This means that companies could face worldwide
liability. Yet do they not already in some ways? The Internet just seems to
magnify what has existed already. Even if there is a judgment, the plaintiff
still must collect and, as other plaintiffs have discovered, enforcing a foreign
judgment in the United States, particularly a libel judgment, can be next to
impossible. ' Dow Jones has found many companies who apparently perceive
their economic self-interest as well as business publishing future to be at stake,
to join in the case. However, it would be too narrow to paint those siding with
Dow Jones as motivated solely by money or self-interest. Some are clearly
motivated by a desire to maintain the Internet as borderless and either self-
regulated or without government imposed regulation.
III. TECHNOLOGICAL SOLUTIONS
While the international community struggles with the concept ofjurisdic-
tion and whether one country can enforce the delisting of offensive Internet
auction items or the restriction of speech, technology offers a way that may
circumvent this problem. Some countries have already tried to block access
to certain sites. Countries which seek to block Internet access do so for a
variety of reasons, from objection to pornography to fear of political
dissidents. For example, Saudi Arabia, where public access to the Web only
started in 1999, blocks pornography, material defamatory to the royal family,
Internet chat rooms and certain explicit anatomy sites.'" Some citizens
respond in Saudi Arabia by playing cat and mouse with the government, using
anonynizing software to evade the block. This may work for several months
only to have another block placed by the Saudi government, and the game
starts over.2° One example, Safe Web,"0' allowed people from Saudi Arabia
to log on and then view any Web site. Saudi Arabia shut down the Web site.
Traffic dropped from "70,000 to 0," but Safe Web simply e-mailed new
Gutnick, [2002] HCA 56,148.
'"See Matusevitch, 877 F. Supp. at 34.
'"See Jennifer S. Lee, Punching Holes in Internet Walls, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at GI.
20 See id.




technology which was capable of evading the government's block.2°2 It is
interesting that technology has cut a way through these blocking devices:
[a]lmost all the censoring governments exercise control through
central gateways. Saudi Arabia spent two years developing the
hardware and software necessary to filter almost all Web data
entering the country through a central server. Residents can
circumvent government controls by connecting to the Web
through foreign-based servers and through satellite phones or by
using the file transfer protocol. But these methods require either
money or some computer expertise.2 3
These anonymizing devices not only work for the innocently curious who
are eager to evade their countries' prudish restrictions, but also for would-be
terrorists who want to navigate the Web, get information and share plans
without detection.2'
Newer technology offers more opportunities to countries and businesses.
One commentator describes this technology:
[t]he only "passports" to the Internet are IP addresses, a string of
numbers that have no direct correlation to the location of a user's
computer. Geolocation technology, initially developed to
facilitate geographically targeted advertising, purports to be able
to determine location but the products are relatively new and
their claims untested." 5
Geo-targeting may be most useful to countries and those industries that "must
frequently respect national or state boundaries where they do business.
Both pharmaceutical companies and pornography merchants will be interested
in this technology. 2 7 The music business, with its concern about copyright and
2M See id.
20' See id.
2 See id. (noting that people who use this new technology have no way of knowing what
passes through their computer and that governments cannot block this information).
' Tamara Loomis, Jurisdiction: Yahoo Decision Affords Internet Companies a Temporary
Respite From Worry, 6 No. 8, INTERNET NEWSLETTER 5, Nov. 2001.
206 See Bob Tedeschi, E-Commerce; Borderless Is Out; Advertisers Now Want to Know If a
Customer Lives in Cairo, Egypt or Cairo, Ill., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2001, at Cl 0.
207 Don Bauder, Deck Seems Stacked Against Local Net Gaming, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB.,
Apr. 21, 2002, at H2; Balint, supra note 72, at A-i.
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distribution rights, will also be an early tester of this technology."' As
mentioned previously, Virtgame.com, a San Diego based company, found a
way to block persons residing in the U.S. from gambling on offshore Web
sites. Its founder, Bruce Merati, noted, "The Internet is worldwide with no
boundaries, no ownership and no legal jurisdiction. Our technology estab-
lishes boundaries on the Internet." 209
Technological innovation will reshape this area. Already, designers like
Tim Berners-Lee of the new "semantic web," 10 offer promise of technology
with unfathomable capability.
Cass Sunstein, the prolific professor from the University of Chicago, raised
concerns about a technological response to the Internet regulation problem.
In his recent book Republic.corn, he addressed his concern that "perfect
filtering," which would allow Internet users not to see anything they wished
to avoid (or their government chose for them not to see) would have a
deleterious impact on democracy. Dan Hunter rebutted Sunstein's
Republic.corn in his recent law review and identified "perfect filtering" as "a
hypothetical technology [beyond NetNanny and CyberPatrol] enabling a
person to receive only the media content that she or he desires, by filtering out
all other material." '' Hunter fundamentally disagreed with Sunstein on
several fronts. First, Hunter argued that "perfect filtering" is "technologically
implausible." ' Secondly, he argued that, even if such technology existed, it
would not differ from the filtering we have in media now and would not
necessarily lead to any more political extremism than exists today.2 Hunter
concluded with an affirmation that "the Internet is the greatest communications
medium we have ever seen. Its benefits are great, and its risks to democracy
slight."'
4
Whether or not Sunstein proves correct and "perfect filtering" does
develop, the technological developments offer individuals and businesses the
opportunity to further target their audience as well as to filter messages that
reach them.
208 See Tedeschi, supra note 206, at CIO (giving as an example Vivendi Universal Music
group who has been using this technology to trace a user's location to better enable them to
comply with each jurisdiction's laws).
209 Balint, supra note 72.
20 See David R. Baker, Tech Visionaries Push the Semantic Web, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 16,
2002, at B 1.2' Dan Hunter, PHILIPPIC. COMRepublic.com, 90 CAL. L. REV. 611,614 (2002) (reviewing
CAss. R. SUSTEIN, REPUBUiC.COM (2002)).
212 Id.
213 See id.
214 Id. at 616.
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For example, development of the VCR, which allowed individuals to record
TV shows and watch them later when they could fast forward through the
commercials, led businesses to try to integrate commercials into the actual
contents. As a result, we now see increased product placements in movies as
advertising. The visions of the Jetsons that many grew up with on television
are becoming a reality.
The debate to date has been framed as a legal one over jurisdiction but the
role of technology and its potential to reframe the debate must be
acknowledged. Lawrence Lessig, a noted cyber-scholar, has stated, "[t]his is
a battle at the level of the architecture. It is the code of cyberspace that gives
privacy and takes it away."21 The role of code and technology as the bricks
of the 21st century is clear.
IV. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS
There have been a number of efforts to deal with these issues
internationally. The most significant was the Council of Europe's opening for
signature of the Convention on Cybercrime,1 6 which the United States, Japan,
Canada and South Africa have already signed. The Convention has three main
parts: harmonization, coordination of criminal investigations and prosecutions,
and effectiveness of operations." 7 One of the key features is the focus on
jurisdiction. This will be a major development if and when the Convention is
implemented internationally. The Convention states that each country must
establish its jurisdiction when an offense is committed within its territory, on
board a boat or a plane registered in that country or when one of its nationals
commits an offense that does not come within the jurisdiction of any other
country. '18 Twenty-six countries signed the Treaty on its opening.219 Others
have followed and will continue to do so.' Although the Convention ducked
2"1 See Lee, supra note 199.
216 See Council of Europe, Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, ETS No. 185,
available at http://conventions.coe.int; see also Cybercrime: Council of Europe Convention
Opened for Signature, Europe Information Service, TECH EUROPE, Nov. 29, 2001, at sect. No.
0198 (listing relevant sections of the convention).
217 Id.
219 Id.
219 Id. Those signing Treaty are Albania, Armenia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Moldova, Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. Non-Council members also signed including
Canada, Japan, South Africa, and the United States.
' See Fergus Cassidy, Retention ofPrivacy; ETHOS, SUNDAYTRIB. (Ireland), Feb. 9,2003,
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the issue of when something is committed within a given country's territory,
it implies agreement that this could take place either where the actor acted or
where the victim received the message. This is recognized worldwide as a
significant development.22'
The Council of Europe is drafting an accompanying side agreement or
Protocol which "will make racist and xenophobic propaganda via computer
networks an offence."'  The United States did not want this included in the
Convention as a whole and insisted it go to a side agreement. 23 The United
States has a long history of tolerating offensive speech as part of a broad view
of the protection of freedom of speech. However, as suggested earlier, two
cases being considered in the next term by the Supreme Court may revisit this
issue.2
Another convention, the Draft Hague Convention on Jurisdiction and
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,"5 proposed by the Hague
Conference on Private International Law and adopted by special commission
on October 30, 1999, addressed many issues including defamation on the
Internet. 26 However, this is unlikely to be ratified because of nations'
concerns about preserving their own national approach to law.
Before an international consensus can be reached, there first needs to be
independent national consensus. Groups such as the American Bar Associa-
tion are helpful in beginning this discussion. The American Bar Association
Global Cyberspace Jurisdiction Project: London Meeting Draft was an
important step in the international discussion.2 7 Change and consensus
building can occur despite pundits who posture that it is impossible to effect
an international consensus. One need only examine the history of the
at 13.
11 See Pavan Duggal, Cyberlaw200-Two Dramatic Developments, Mondaq Ltd., at http://
www.cyberlaws.net/article.htm (Jan. 3, 2002) (identifying Yahoo! case and Cybercrime Treaty
as the two most important developments in 2001).
2 Carl S. Kaplan, New Economy: Bracingfor a Flood of Efforts to Control Speech Seen as
Hateful or Terrorist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 2002, at C3.
223 Id.; see also Council of Europe Moves to Ban Internet Hate Speech, INFO. STRATEGIC
BUSINESS INFORMATION DATABASE, Nov. 18,2001.
2 For discussion ofcross burning and abortion doctor Web site cases, see supra notes 81-87
and accompanying text.
I Preliminary Draft Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, adopted by the Special Commission of the Hague Conference, art. 28(0,
available at http://hcch.net/e/conventions/draft36c.html.
2' See Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick, [2001] V.S. at 25.
" American Bar Association Global Jurisdiction in Cyberspace Project,A chievingLegaland
Business Order in Cyberspace: A Report on Global Jurisdiction Issues Created by the Internet
(London Meeting Draft 2000), available at http://www.abanet.org [hereinafter Report].
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movement from the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act2 8 to the
International Convention Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions.229 The drafters of the ABA report
concluded:
[b]eyond private ordering the harmonization of substantive laws
across state and national lines can obviate at least one of the
jurisdictional issues, that of prescriptive jurisdiction. To the
extent the law of all fora related in any way to the dispute is the
same, it matters little which is applied. In many instances, of
course, such harmonization will be exceedingly difficult;
different states, with different understandings of the needs and
rights of those they protect, will argue for very different results
with respect to such things as consumer protection, gambling and
libel etc. On the other hand, there is likely to be agreement that
fraud in the offering of securities is to be prevented. The greater
the common understanding, even if laws are not identical, the
greater is the likelihood that differences will matter little to the
parties, (and) compliance with both will flow more easily from
compliance with one."0
Following this logic, the greatest potential for success will stem from those
areas internationally where there is the most common ground. In a post
September 11 world, the world community may agree on the need for a
uniform approach to dealing with terrorism, trafficking in nuclear materials
and weaponry and terrorist threats. Even the United States and its Court may
be willing to interpret the Constitution to accomplish this goal.
V. CONCLUSIONS: SUGGESTIONS FOR CHANGE
The cataclysmic events of September 11, 2001 forever changed"' the
landscape in the United States, and the legal, social and psychic reverberations
' See Foreign Corruption Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (adding §§ 78dd-1 and
78dd-2 and amending §§ 78m and 78ff); see also Symposium, supra note 15.
1' See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions, Dec. 18, 1997, 37. I.L.M. 1 (1998).
230 See Report, supra note 227, at 176.
231 Hans Christian Krueger, Deputy Head ofCouncil of Europe, commented, "after the events
of September 11, life has changed for everyone in our countries." Therese Jauffret, Cybercrime
Pact to Target Terrorists, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 23, 2001.
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will be felt for many years to come. Prior to this date, the Supreme Court of
the United States supported virtually unfettered freedom of speech and, as a
consequence, the Internet existed unregulated and unmonitored. Post
September 11, the United States has moved closer to many other Western
countries in permitting the balance to shift from protecting civil liberties from
governmental intrusion to a posture of oversight and regulation to promote
security. 2  Although this balance is being debated and will be tested in the
courts for years to come, the events of September 1 1 will no doubt have an
impact on the debate about borders on the Internet.
The Cybercrime Treaty was an important first step towards convergence.
As an international community, we must find some common legal ground on
censorship. The Protocol on Hate Crimes may be a starting point, particularly
if the Supreme Court clarifies the limits of free speech on the Internet this
term. Child pornography and securities fraud offer other possible areas of
agreement.
The market itself may find new ways to address what first presented itself
as a jurisdictional issue. Geolocation technology will develop and will allow
the approximation of "perfect filtering." Governments have always chosen to
use existing means to block access to some information for citizens. Compa-
nies will use this technology to insulate themselves from liability, making clear
that they took reasonable efforts to block certain groups' access to their sites.
Businesses may also amend user agreements so there is a consent to jurisdic-
tion by anyone who posts information via the server vis-a-vis anyone who
downloads the posting. The "chill" of forcing people to accept the conse-
quences of what they post in cyberspace is not necessarily a bad outcome since
the potential damage in cyberspace is so much greater; a cyberspace whisper
can literally reach millions of people. 3
Absent a treaty, countries will still have different standards. In problematic
contexts, as when Australia advanced a tough defamation standard, businesses
23 Cf Alan Dershowitz, Editorial, Why FearNational ID Cards?, N.Y.TIMEs, Oct. 13,2001;
Jay Winik, Security Comes Before Liberty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2001, at A26.
2- See Jonathan Este, Worldwide Whispers, WEEKEND AUSTL, Apr. 7, 2001, at 26 (telling
the story of Claire Squire, a dotcom manager in London who wrote her boyfriend a graphic email
praising his sexual prowess. He sent the email to about 6 friends and within a week 10 million
people had received the message); Tom Rawstorne, Trader Who Emailed Himself Out of.A Job,
DAILY MAIL, May 31, 2001, at 37 (providing another example the "Squire Effect," where an
email description of a sexual act gets forwarded around the globe in a short period of time(hours). In this case, a young man, sent to South Korea, e-mails his sexual exploits to friends.
Because his email was forwarded, so widely, he resigned from his $100,000 position).
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will not sell to subscribers in that country. Then, subscribers will have to use
alternate technological solutions to order anonymizer software, to buy access.
Courts around the world are embracing a broader view ofjurisdiction, not
only in Internet related matters but also in other cases when conduct affects
persons within its borders. While this may threaten the concept of the
borderless Internet, it offers new opportunities to protect intellectual property
rights. 234
It may be inevitable in cyberspace, as it was on terrafirma, that fences will
be erected. The fences are the legal demarcations of crossing into a different
zone with different rules. However, these fences will still be permeable,
analogous to the situation where those who desire to visit Cuba can easily
circumvent the United States travel ban to Cuba. The new cyberspace will
have open spaces too, where people can meet in the equivalent of international
waters.
Cyberspace will continue to be a focus of overlapping jurisdictions, just as
other business transactions may be subject to multiple jurisdictions. This
overlap has never halted commerce before and will not now. While companies
may have the right to peddle trash, they may choose not to. Ethical self-
regulation may forestall some of the push for additional legal regulation of the
Internet.
There is no escaping the uneasy balance between regulation and freedom,
especially when the regulation is done in the name of security. As a nation, we
must struggle with how to handle the new frontier of cyberspace along side our
international neighbors. Our experience in space may be a good beginning.
We must proceed slowly, working together, finding areas of agreement,
tolerating national differences, and adjusting as technology changes the entire
landscape in ways we never contemplated.
" See, Eugene Gulland, All the World's a Forum, NAT. L.J., Feb. 11, 2002, at B13.
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